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NOTE AND COMMENT
The duty of the secretary of state is independent of legislative
authorization. The section makes no mention whatever of action
by the general assembly.35 Nor can it be justifiably argued that
by implication the legislature has the power to approve or dis-
approve the submission, for those who framed and ratified the
section intended that it be independent of legislative acquies-
cence.38 This intent would be effectively defeated 7 and the con-
stitutional mandate would be unenforceable if the duty were
construed to be conditioned upon such legislative action. Further-
more it would render article XV, section 4 nugatory; in effect
the section would then become a mere recommendation to the
general assembly. By reason of. article XV, section 3 the legis-
lature already has power to submit the question at will; the
legal effect of the two sections must have been meant to be
different. To read legislative acquiescence into article XV, sec-
tion 4 would be to fly in the face of recognized rules of constitu-
tional interpretation and the apparent will of the people as ex-
pressed in their constitution.38
H. S. H.
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO AMEND OR REPEAL
DIRECT LEGISLATION
It is a fundamental principle of our system of representative
government that the legislative department has plenary power to
enact laws and to amend or repeal them, subject only to the pro-
visions of the constitution from which this power arises. During
the first two decades of this century, however, the spirit of gov-
ernmental reform which produced such phenomena as the Pro-
gressive Movement, resulted in the adoption in most of our west-
ern states of constitutional changes designed to reserve to the
people the right to enact legislation directly, independently of
posed upon him by constitutional provision or by statute, and he refused to
act, that the writ [of mandamus] was not allowed."
35. See note 1, supra.
36. See notes 11 & 14, supra.
37. A rule of constitutional construction requires that the courts give
effect to every part of the constitution. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions (8th ed. 1927) 128 states:CC* * * The courts * * * must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which will make some words
idle and nugatory."
38. The writer suggests that article XV, section 3 be revised to ex-
pressly place the duty upon the secretary of state with or without legislative
authorization and also to provide expressly that he may be compelled by
mandamus to submit the question under the periodic provision. This would
obviate all possibility of litigation.
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their legislative assemblies, by means of the initiative and refer-
endum. Thus there was set up in effect a two-fold legislative
structure with independent powers and the possibility of conflict
between the people functioning as legislators and their represen-
tative legislatures. Because of the democratic axiom of popular
sovereignty, however, legislation which proceeds immediately
from the people may in a sense be considered to share the special
sanction of organic law as formulated in the state constitutions.
The question is then presented whether the reservation to the
electorate of legislative powers prohibits representative bodies
otherwise having complete legislative power from repealing or
amending the "people's laws."
This question obviously can be answered only with reference
to individual jurisdictions by examination of the particular con-
stitutional provisions defining the respective powers. The con-
struction which has been placed upon these provisions in opera-
tion, however, supports the general proposition that legislative
bodies do have the plenary power, limited only by express con-
stitutional restrictions, to amend or repeal any law whatever,
regardless of the manner of its enactment.
The initiative amendments of the constitutions of the eighteen
states which have adopted them meet this problem with provi-
sions ranging from express authorization to absolute prohibition
of the repealing power of the legislature. The issue is perhaps
most clearly presented, however, in cases decided under amend-
ments which are entirely silent on the point." In this group of
six states it has been uniformly held, whenever the question has
arisen, that the legislature's power is coordinate with that re-
served to the people, and that either can at any time exercise this
power on any law.2 A further group of four states have been
aided in reaching the same conclusion by the provision that the
amendment "shall not be construed to deprive any legislator from
introducing any measure." 3 The amendment in two states ex-
pressly affirms the right.4
1. Idaho Const. (1890) art. III, §1 (as amended 1912); Me. Const. (1876)
art. XXXI (as amended 1908); Mont. Const. (1889) art. V, §1 (as amended
1906); Neb. Const. (1875) art. III, §§2, 3 (as amended 1920); Ohio Const.
(1851) art. II, §§la-g (as amended 1912); Utah Const. (1895) art. VI,§1(2) (Amendment of 1900 as amended 1930).
2. In re Opinion of Justices (1933) 132 Me. 512, 174 At]. 853; State ex
rel. Goodman v. Stewart (1920) 57 Mont. 144, 187 Pac. 641; Schreifer v.
City of Auburn (1923) 110 Neb. 179, 193 N. W. 350; State ex rel. Singer v.
Cartledge (1935) 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N. E. 237, 97 A. L. R. 1040; Ohio
Ops. Att'y Gen. (1923) p. 471.
3. Colo. Const. (1876) art. V, §1 (as amended 1910); Mo. Const. (1875)
art. IV, §57 (as amended 1908); Ore. Const. (1859) art. IV, §1 (as amended
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Of the remaining states, two place an absolute ban on such
legislative action "unless otherwise provided in said initiative
measure,"5 while one denies the power only if the initiated law
is "approved by a majority vote of the qualified electors. ' 6 Two
jurisdictions require a legislative majority of "two-thirds of all
the members elected to each house" to modify or repeal direct
legislation7 and two prescribe a two- and a three-year waiting
period before this is permitted.8 Decisions in these jurisdictions
1902); S. D. Const. (1889) art III, §1 (as amended 1898); In re Senate
Pesol. No. 4 (1913) 54 Colo. 262, 130 Pac. 333; Clark v. Austin (Mo. 1937)
101 S. W. (2d) 977; State ex rel. Drain v. Becker (Mo. 1922) 240 S. W.
229; State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach (1910) 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W.
689, 139 Am. St. Rep. 639; Kadderly v. Portland (1903) 44 Ore. 118, 74
Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222; Patton v. Withycombe (1916) 81 Ore. 210, 159 Pac.
78; State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher (1926) 119 Ore. 141, 248 Pac. 358; State
ex rel. Richards v. Whisman (1915) 36 S. D. 260, 154 N. W. 707, L. R. A.
1917 B, 1 (appeal dismissed 1916).
4. Mass. Const. (1790) Amend. XLVIII (1918) art. VI, §176; Okla.
Const. (1907) art. V, §§13455, 13462.
5. Cal. Const. (1879) art. IV, §1 (amendment of 1911 as amended 1932);
Mich. Const. (1909) art. V, §1 (as amended 1913); but note that the legis-
lature is specifically empowered to amend or repeal at any subsequent ses-
sion measures submitted to referendum and approved, and also to propose
amendments to the people. Beneficial Loan Society v. Haight (1932) 215
Cal. 506, 11 P. (2d) 857 (Statute in irreconcilable conflict with initiated
law held invalid.); People v. Wood (1928) 88 Cal. App. 621, 264 Pac. 298(Law originally enacted by legislature, then referred to people and approved
may be amended.); Ex parte Statham (1920) 31 Cal. Dec. 193, 187 Pac.
986 (When ordinance is suspended by referendum petition, city council may
pass another ordinance dealing with same subject matter if not an attempt
to evade the referendum and differing in essential features from the first.).
6. Ariz. Const. (1912) art. IV, pt. 1, §1(6) (as amended 1914); this
applies also to laws submitted to referendum. (Previous to 1914, when this
provision was added, the amendment was silent on this point, excepting the
provision enabling the legislature to "enact any measure.") McBride v.
Kerby (1927) 32 Ariz. 515, 260 Pac. 435 (When statute has been suspended
by referendum petition, legislature may enact another on same subject mat-
ter and attach emergency clause to prevent referendum.).
7. Ark. Const. (1874) art. V, §1, amend. No. 7 (1909 as amended 1919);
N. D. Const. (1889) art. II, §25 (as amended 1918); State ex rel. Truax v.
Smart (1921) 48 N. D. 326, 184 N. W. 623; Boutous v. Thoresen (1926)
54 N. D. 289, 209 N. W. 558 (Statutes conflicting with initiated laws and
passed by less than required majority held invalid.).
8. Nev. Const. (1864) art. XIX (amendment of 1904) §§206, 207 (3
years) (Note that laws approved on referendum may be amended only by
direct vote.); Wash. Const. (1889) art. II, §1 (as amended 1912) (2 years);
Tesoriere v. Dist. Ct. (1927) 50 Nev. 302, 258 Pac. 291 (Substitute measure
proposed and enacted by initiative under procedure enabling legislature to
propose a substitute bill to be voted on along with original initiative measure
held not subject to referendum and therefore amendable after three years.) ;
Ajax v. Gregory (1934) 177 Wash. 465, 32 P. (2d) 560 (Legislature can
regulate liquor sales even though "Bone Dry" liquor law is repealed by
initiative.); State v. Gibson (1922) 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390; State v.
Miller (1922) 121 Wash. 153, 209 Pac. 9. (Two year provision refers to
time measure is enacted and so proclaimed by governor, not to time law
goes into effect.)
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of course consider the circumscribed scope of legislative power,
and are mainly concerned with iceties of form and procedure.9
None provides authority for the view that the legislature is re-
stricted in any way other than by explicit constitutional man-
date.10 Indeed such partial limitation inferentially sanctions leg-
islative action when not expressly precluded."
It is then universally concluded that only express constitutional
limitation curtails the plenary power of representative bodies to
amend or repeal at will. This provokes further consideration of
whether this power ought not on grounds of policy to be re-
stricted or withdrawn in those states which have not done so.
It is probably not yet time to attempt any final evaluation of
the initiative and referendum as practical political instrumen-
talities. Students of political science appear to agree that the
electorate has nowhere been sufficiently aroused to such radical
use of these devices as would constitute a definitive test.1 2 It is
9. The simple issue whether the legislature has this overriding repealing
power has seldom been squarely presented in any of the jurisdictions above.
It is ordinarily decided in the affirmative as a collateral issue and reiterated
by way of dictum in subsequent cases.
10. Five cases dealing with the power of a city council to amend ordi-
nances passed by means of local initiative procedures contain language
seemingly contra to this view. Examination of these, however, shows that
all five turned on express limitations in the charters of the respective cities.
Allen v. Hollingsworth (1933) 246 Ky. 812, 56 S. W. (2d) 530; Holland v.
Cranfill (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 308; Stetson v. Seattle (1913) 74
Wash. 606, 134 Pac. 494; State ex rel. Knez v. Seattle (1934) 176 Wash.
283, 28 P. (2d) 1020, 33 P. (2d) 905; State ex rel. Gabbert v. MacQueen
(1918) 82 W. Va. 44, 95 S. E. 666. Compare ex parte Statham (1920)
31 Cal. Dec. 193, 187 Pac. 986; In re Megnella (1916) 133 Minn. 98, 157
N. W. 991 (when ordinance is suspended pending referendum city council
may pass another ordinance on same subject matter if differing in essential
features and not done to evade referendum.) State ex rel. Singer v. Cart-
ledge (1935) 129 Ohio St. 279, 195 N. E. 237, 97 A. L. R. 1046. (City
council of non-charter municipality may repeal ordinances adopted by local
initiative.) The cases cited in footnotes 2, 3, 7 and 8 supra all either hold
squarely or affirm without argument that only express constitutional limi-
tations can curtail the amending power of the legislature.
11. Another such factor is the provision for attaching an emergency
clause to legislation in order to prevent petition for referendum. By infer-
ence this supports the view that the amending power of legislatures is to
be no more restricted than is expressly stated. Other provisions operate to
limit the area of possible conflict by limiting the permissible subject matter
of direct legislation. These vary from a large number of general and
specific prohibitions in Massachusetts (Mass. Const. (1790) art. XLVIII,
II, 2, §152.) to the single exception of appropriation bills in a number of
states.
12. Barnett, James D., The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and
Recall in Oregon (1915) c. xv; Key, V. 0., Jr. and Crouch, Winston W.,
The Initiative and the Referendum in California (1939) ; Pollack, James K.,
The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan (Mich. Gov't. Studies No. 6,
1940) 66 ff.
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possible, however, using the experience of states with roughly
corresponding political, economic, and social conditions as a sort
of "control experiment," to state a few tentative conclusions in
general terms. It is clear, for instance, that the "parade of hor-
rors" predicted by opponents of these measures has not yet ap-
peared.'3 Nor on the other hand has direct legislation effected the
realization of any discernible Utopia. It is probable that it has
exercised no profound influence on the habits and attitudes of
the legislatures which have had to deal with it.14 Public indif-
ference in many states, together with the inherently cumbersome
procedure of the initiative and referendum, operated to confine
laws enacted by the direct method to an insignificant fraction of
the total volume of legislation." It may even be that the principal
long-run value of the innovation will prove to have been the edu-
cation of the individual voter in public matters.' 6
Nevertheless, a dispassionate view of the results of forty years'
experience with direct legislation shows it to have made a con-
siderable contribution to the art of government. It is a useful
instrument of positive action and by virtue of that fact at least
as valuable as companion devices such as the secret ballot, the
official primary, and the corrupt practices acts. There is no doubt
that the people have been able to turn it to good use in enacting
legislation in spite of irresponsive and recalcitrant legislatures,
and its effect in enabling effective organization of public opinion
has certainly influenced legislation, even where the measures sub-
mitted were rejected at the polls. "Real popular control" wrote
Professor Dodd, "consists not in the people's passing upon every
public question, but in their having power to pass on every ques-
tion upon which public interest is sufficient to warrant such
action." 7
What then of the advisability of restricting legislative power
to deal with direct legislation? It is urged that legislatures are
13. Both devices in operation exhibit a markedly conservative character.
The referendum in particular lends itself easily to obstructionist tactics in
the legislature, while the initiative, whether from public indifference or sub-
stantial satisfaction with government has been confined largely to isolated
bills representing some particular group interest and backed by that group.
The governmental mechanism certainly remains in the same hands as before.
14. Barnett, op. cit. supra, note 12, c. xviii.
15. Faust, Popular Sovereignty (1942) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuAR-
TERLY 312.
16. Pollack, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 67; Barnett, op. cit. supra note
12, c. x.
17. Dodd, W. F., Some Considerations Upon the Statewide Initiative and
Referendum (1912) 43 Annals American Academy of Political and Social
Science 215.
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controlled by pressure groups, the "interests," and that to permit
them the power to intermeddle with popular legislation is to null-
ify it. This is theoretically possible. Experience has shown, how-
ever, that this possibility does not appear in practice.18 On the
contrary, representative bodies exhibit a great delicacy in ap-
proaching the "people's laws," and such action as is taken with
respect to them is usually by way of technical modification look-
ing toward more efficient operation. When there is outright re-
peal or amendment inconsistent with the purpose of the initiated
measure, it is usually with the support and approval of news-
papers and civic groups.19
Several objections are advanced to the suggestion that the
legislature be deprived of this power. Generally, it is pointed
out, the proposal continues the policy of attempting to solve legis-
lative evils by progressively circumscribing the legislative de-
partment's capacity for doing harm and so limiting its ability
to legislate wisely.F0 This is criticized as a nostalgic desire to
deal with the increasingly complex economic and social conflicts
of a dynamic society by returning to the forms of a primitive
democracy rather than by attacking directly the problem of im-
proving the quality of representative bodies. It is certainly true
that the initiative and referendum tend to detract from the
authority and dignity of legislative office and so to further legis-
lative incompetence and irresponsibility. It is also true that
directly enacted laws do not undergo the legislative sifting and
hammering process, the reconciling and harmonizing of conflict-
ing group interests, which results in laws which may be inte-
grated into a broad legislative program. This is a valid criticism
,and some ground for allowing the legislature the power to adjust
-inconsistent and technically imperfect legislation.2  That it has
18. Barnett, op. cit. supra note 12, at 130.
19. The attitude toward popular legislation varies from a doctrine of
absolute non-interference to regarding it as a mandate to be interpreted.
Legislators incline to professing agreement with the popular feeling that
such legislation ought not be tampered with, from understandable motives.
Some inconsistency in action appears, however, in that a good deal has been
done by way of resubmission and modification of measures.
20. Beard, Chas. A., and Shultz, Birl E., Documents on the Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall (1912) introd. note; Bryce, James, Modern Democ-
racies (1921) vol. ii, c. LXV; Hall, Arnold B., Popular Government (1921)
c. ix; Munro, Win. B., The Government of the United States (1923).
21. The history of direct legislation is not free from instances of "sugar-
coated" bills, bills omitting the enacting clause, bills with conflicting provi-
sions, etc. It is common practice, however, for the sponsors of initiative
measures to engage the services of skilled draughtsmen with the result that
most such statutes compare favorably with the normal legislature's product
so far as technical competence is concerned. See Beard, op. cit. note 2,
supra, introd. note.
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not been a very apparent difficulty is perhaps due to the com-
paratively negligible number of such laws in the total bulk of
legislation, as well as to the very general power to amend them
when necessary.
Another argument advanced in support of the legislative
amending and repealing power is the need to discourage the
adoption, through the efforts of well-organized minority groups,
of laws not designed to promote the general social interest.22
Also the point is made that the power to amend prevents the
possibility of doubt being cast on the technical validity of laws
enacted in the normal manner by reason of this possible incon-
sistency with the body of inviolable "secondary constitutional
law" which would develop by direct legislation. 23 If these con-
tentions do not present any very burning issue, nevertheless they
represent real values as against the seemingly theoretical gain of
safeguarding against possible abuse of a power by eliminating it.
Whether the legislative departments' power should be curtailed
in this respect, then, is a decision of policy. The experience of
the various states indicates little weight of advantage between
total or partial restriction and no restriction at all. That there
has been small abuse of the power is of course no guarantee that
there will not be, and it is possible that some form of limitation
is a wise precaution. 24 The expediency of either course, however,
must wait for final determination until use of the direct method
of legislation produces a sufficient volume of law to render more
acute whatever adverse effects it may have on the vital social
interests from which all legislation springs.25  R. W. K.
22. Compare here instances of local and state prohibition laws which
proved to be unenforceable in many cases because of the unreadiness of
the public at large for such measures. Hall, op. cit. supra note 20, at 14
remarks that a study of popular votes even on general principles shows
an instability which may indicate further that even the decision of those
who vote represents passing fancy rather than considered opinion.
23. A related point is of particular interest in Missouri, where, as in
several other states, the procedures for statutory and constitutional initia-
tives exactly correspond. This results in a blurring of the distinction be-
tween organic law and ordinary legislation. Many states avoid this diffi-
culty by requiring a greater number of signatures on petitions to initiate
amendments. See Faust, Popular Sovereignty (1942) 27 WASHINGTON U.
LAW QUARTERLY 312.
24. In this connection note the tendency for voters to use the constitu-
tional initiative in preference to the statutory form, although this does not
appear to have been misused. That constitutional amendments are less often
rejected at the polls than proposed statutory measures is perhaps due in
part to the greater voter participation on such issues.
25. For a suggestion following the California and Michigan practice of
allowing repeal or amendment only by direct vote coupled with power of
the legislature to propose changes see Note, Should the Power of Represen-
tative Bodies in Ohio to Repeal or Amend Acts Adopted by Popular Vote
be Expressly Restricted? (1936) 4 Ohio L. Rep. 326.
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